Unpublished Opinion; Shall not constitute precedent or be binding upon any court
Submitted by New Jersey Domestic Violence Lawyer, Jeffrey Hark.
Parties:
Plaintiff: L.D.
Defendant: M.J.M.
Proc. Hist.: Trial Court denied plaintiff’s request for a final restraining order and vacated temporary restraining order against defendant. Plaintiff argues on appeal that (1) trial judge erred in failing to consider defendant’s “past acts;” and (2) her allegations satisfied the predicate acts of harassment and stalking pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(a).
Facts: Parties were in a relationship for approximately three years and had a child together. On 1/23/20 defendant went to plaintiff’s residence to visit their child. After entertaining the child for a period of time plaintiff request defendant feed the child. Upon defendant’s decline a brief argument ensued and plaintiff contends defendant “jumped near her face inches away and told her this is [the] stuff I’m talking about.” At some point the parties apologized to each other the defendant fed the child and left the residence at around 9 pm. Plaintiff did not call the police and no arrest was made.
The next day plaintiff filed a TRO against defendant alleging harassment under N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(a)(13), which was granted. Plaintiff testified defendant would barge into her room to see if she was cheating on him; that defendant would “grab” her and “yell” in her face, accusing her of inferentiality. Plaintiff claims she did not feel safe. Because Plaintiff only included these allegations as part of the prior history of domestic violence, the trial judge permitter her to amend the TRO. Amended TRO reiterated claims made at the pro se hearing and offered no new substantive facts.
Issue: Did the trial court err in denying plaintiff’s request for an FRO and vacating the TRO?
Holding: The trial court did not err in denying plaintiff’s request for an FRO and vacating the TRO.
Rule: “In our review of a trial court’s order entered following trial in a domestic violence matter, we grant substantial deference to the trial court’s findings of fact and the legal conclusions based upon those findings.” D.N. v. K.M., 429 N.J. Super. 592, 596 (App. Div. 2013) (citing Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411-12 (1998)).
“This deferential standard is even more appropriate ‘when the evidence is largely testimonial and involves questions of credibility.’ ” L.M.F. v. J.A.F., Jr., 421 N.J. Super. 523, 533 (App. Div. 2011) (quoting In re Return of Weapons to J.W.D., 149 N.J. 108, 117 (1997)).
“Reversal is warranted only when a mistake must have been made because the trial court’s factual findings are ‘so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice ….’” Elrom v. Elrom, 439 N.J. Super. 424, 433 (App. Div. 2015) (quoting Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Inv’rs Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974)).
“However, we review de novo “the trial judge’s legal conclusions, and the application of those conclusions to the facts.” Ibid. (quoting Reese v. Weis, 430 N.J. Super. 552, 568 (App. Div. 2013)).
In domestic violence cases the trial judge has a “two-fold” task. First the judge must determine whether the plaintiff has proven, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant committed one of the predicate acts referenced in N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(a). The judge must “consider in light of whether there is a previous history of domestic violence.” Next, the judge must determine whether a restraining order is necessary, after evaluating the factors set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a), “to protect the victim from an immediate danger or to prevent further abuse.”
In this case, the trial judge gave Plaintiff ample opportunity to amend her TRO to list specific instances of domestic violence. The plaintiff’s amended TRO was devoid of any specific allegations that would support a finding of harassment. When evidence is largely of a testimonial nature, as it was in this case, and hinges upon a trial judge’s ability to make assessments of credibility based on his or her observations of testifying witnesses, deference is particularly appropriate. Based upon the credibility determinations adduced at the two hearings by the trial judge the Appellate Division affirmed.
Reasoning: In this case, the trial judge gave Plaintiff ample opportunity to amend her TRO to list specific instances of domestic violence. The plaintiff’s amended TRO was devoid of any specific allegations that would support a finding of harassment. When evidence is largely of a testimonial nature, as it was in this case, and hinges upon a trial judge’s ability to make assessments of credibility based on his or her observations of testifying witnesses, deference is particularly appropriate. Based upon the credibility determinations adduced at the two hearings by the trial judge the Appellate Division affirmed.
Disposition: Affirmed.